The High Court of Australia has delivered its decision in Taylor v Killer Queen LLC [2026] HCA 5, resolving a long-running dispute between Australian fashion designer “Katie Perry” and the internationally famous singer “Katy Perry” in favour of the fashion designer.
The dispute concerned competing commercial uses of the names “KATIE PERRY” and “KATY PERRY” in connection with clothing and merchandise.
For businesses managing brands or brand expansion, the following are key takeaways:
Katie Jane Taylor (born Katie Jane Perry) is an Australian fashion designer. Ms Taylor launched a clothing label under the name “KATIE PERRY” in 2007.
Katy Perry (born Katheryn Elizabeth Hudson) is a global pop singer. In 2002, Ms Perry adopted the stage name “KATY PERRY” for the purposes of her professional music career and associated companies, Kitty Purry Inc and Killer Queen.
On 29 September 2008, the designer registered the trade mark “KATIE PERRY” in Australia in respect of goods within class 25 for ‘clothing, footwear, headgear’ (the Designer’s Mark).
In October of 2008, the singer began to sell branded “Katy Perry” merchandise on her website. However, as at the priority date of the Designer’s Mark, the singer had not yet sold branded merchandise in Australia.
On 21 July 2009, the singer registered the trade mark “KATY PERRY” in Australia in respect of classes 9 and 41 (the Singer’s Mark).
Following failed attempts between the parties to negotiate a co-existence agreement, the designer commenced proceedings in late 2019 in the Federal Court of Australia. The action was filed against the singer and her associated companies, alleging that the singer’s sales and promotion of “KATY PERRY” branded clothing and merchandise in Australia infringed the Designer’s Mark pursuant to section 120 of the TM Act on the basis the Singer’s Mark was “substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to” the Designer’s Mark.
In response, the singer filed a cross claim seeking rectification of the register by cancelling the Designer’s Mark pursuant to section 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the basis that the registration of the Designer’s Mark could have been opposed by the singer because the Singer’s Mark had acquired a reputation in Australia in relation to clothing before the priority date of the Designer’s Mark. The singer alleged that, as a result, the use of the Designer’s Mark “would be likely to deceive or cause confusion” by causing consumers to wonder whether there was an affiliation between the designer’s clothing and the singer (sections 88(2)(a) and (c)).
Importantly, however, even if the singer succeeded on her application to cancel the Designer’s Mark, the Court has discretion under section 89(1) of the TM Act to decide whether to grant the application for rectification if the designer satisfied the Court that the ground(s) relied on by the singer did not arise through any act or fault of the designer.
In exercising its discretion, the Court was required to take into account the following matters:
Taylor v Killer Queen, LLC (No 5) [2023] GCA 364
At first instance, the Federal Court of Australia (Markovic J) found in favour of the designer, holding that by the registration date of the Designer’s Mark (29 September 2008), the Singer’s Mark had acquired a reputation in Australia in relation to music and entertainment, not clothing.
In reaching this conclusion, the primary judge relied upon:
The Court rejected the singer’s cross-claim for rectification of the Register by cancelling the Designer’s Mark.
The singer appealed the decision.
Killer Queen, LLC v Taylor [2024] FCAFC 149
On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Yates, Burley and Rofe JJ) overturned the primary judge’s findings in relation to sections 88(2)(a) and (c) of the TM Act, concluding that the singer had established both grounds for rectification (and cancellation of the Designer’s Mark).
The Full Court stated that the primary judge should have found that:
The designer appealed the decision to the High Court of Australia.
By a 3-2 majority, the High Court held in favour of the designer by reason that before the priority date of the Designer’s Mark (29 September 2008):
meaning there was no real and tangible danger of confusion on the part of the ordinary person by use of the Designer’s Mark in a normal and fair way (as required by the concept of notional use).
The High Court held that the singer had not established any ground for cancellation of the Designer’s Mark and ordered the mark to be restored.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that:
This article was written by , Sophia Smythe Solicitor Disputes